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RECONCEPTUALIZING ENTRENCHED NOTIONS OF
COMMON LAW PROPERTY REGIMES: MĀORI SELFDETERMINATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
THROUGH LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR NATURAL OBJECTS
Bridget Williams
INTRODUCTION
The concept of legal personality for land and natural objects
addresses many points of difference between English common law
concepts of property and Māori notions of kinship with and
stewardship of ancestral lands. The two major implementations of this
concept in Aotearoa1 New Zealand have involved the Whanganui
River/Te Awa Tupua Act and the Te Urewera National Park/Te
Urewera Act. This paper will consider where these recent attempts to
formalize legal personalities and the resulting legislative actions have
been successful in bridging gaps in the two conflicting property
regimes – English and Māori – and where they have further to go. It
argues that while the Acts were undertaken as a concession to Māori,
there will be long-term benefits for all Aotearoa New Zealanders in
that these reconceptualizations of property rights provide much
stronger protections for the natural environment, an area where the
common law tradition of property ownership has major weaknesses.
Part I of the paper begins with a brief introduction to the
history of property law in Aotearoa New Zealand, including how the
infliction of settler-colonial common law concepts shaped the
landscape and title-driven property system. Part II provides an
overview of the source of seeming incompatibility of English
common law property law and Māori land relations, focusing on the
concepts of rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga. Part III briefly covers
the origins and goals of the personhood movement, which was started
1

Aotearoa, MAORI.COM, https://www.maori.com/aotearoa (last visited Apr. 20,
2018) (“Aotearoa is the Māori name for the country of New Zealand. The literal
translation of Aotearoa is ‘land of the long white cloud.’”).
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in the 1970s by American law professor Christopher Stone. This part
also includes overviews of the two implementations of the model in
Aotearoa New Zealand thus far – Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua –
including their respective explicit fundamental objectives and
practical methods of implementation.
Part IV of the paper focuses on the specific areas where the
personhood implementations have validated Māori cosmologies, and
where similar types of legislation may solve problems which exist
precisely because of long-standing common law property systems.
Part V focuses on potential long-term benefits from these Acts in
terms of environmental protection and how they address areas where
English common law is particularly weak.
I. INTRODUCTION OF SETTLER-COLONIAL COMMON LAW
PROPERTY REGIMES INTO AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND
Aotearoa New Zealand settler-colonists brought with them a
British-influenced, common law property system and an
anthropocentric approach to property. The overarching theme under
this common law system is that land is owned, and it is owned by
individuals. In many countries that were colonized by the British, the
relationship between the indigenous population and the land was
never recognized, and the land was simply “taken” by the settlercolonists and colonial governments. The indigenous peoples of
Aotearoa New Zealand, whose relationship to the land will be one
focus of this paper, are commonly known as Māori.2
Compared to the British approach in other colonies, the
settler-colonial government in Aotearoa New Zealand actually
recognized Māori ownership, and required that native title be
extinguished before land could be transferred to individual owners. In
the early days of settlement, this was accomplished by large-scale preemptive land sales (some say confiscations) by the Crown, followed

See Jessica C. Lai, Māori Culture in the Modern World: Its Creation,
Appropriation and Trade (Int’l Comm. & Art L. Lucerne, Working Paper No. 2,
2010).
2
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by allocation to local governments for parceling out.3 This process
extinguished the customary title, also known as native title or “right
of occupancy,”4 of huge swaths of land. It is important to understand
that Māori, at this time, had no concept of absolute ownership of land,
and the idea of exclusion and boundaries was very rare.5 This initial
interaction between settler-colonial and native indigenous
perspectives on land provides the perfect illustration for friction to
come. Māori “sellers” believed that the settler-colonial “buyers” were
simply making a gift to them in order to live and share the land with
them.6 In fact, they could not have intended to completely alienate the
land, because this concept would have been foreign to them.
This large-scale process of stripping (what would later be
known as) customary title was then replaced by the Native Lands Act
of 1862. This Act allowed Māori to convert land held by customary
title into “Crown-sanctioned” ownership. The resulting parcels are
known as Māori freehold land and remain under the jurisdiction of
the Māori Land Court, which was created by the Native Land Act in
1865.7 The Māori Land Court is responsible for oversight of Māori
freehold land, including its “status, ownership, management, and
use.”8 Once converted into Māori freehold, the land could be
alienated in ways that Māori chose,9 albeit under the watchful eye of
the Māori Land Court. This process allowed for Māori to bring land

See Richard P. Boast, Recognizing Multi-Textualism: Rethinking New Zealand’s
Legal History, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 547, 577 (2006).
4
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, BACKGROUND NOTE: THE FORESHORE AND SEABED:
MAORI CUSTOMARY RIGHTS AND SOME LEGAL ISSUES (2003).
5
See Māori and Land Ownership, TE ARA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW ZEALAND,
https://teara.govt.nz/en/land-ownership/page-1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
6
Anna Shackell, Ownership, Rangatiratanga and Kaitiakitanga: Different Ways of
Viewing Land Entitlements in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2 TE TAI HARURU: J. MAORI
LEGAL WRITING 86, 93 (2006).
7
W. Galvin, Māori Land Development with Particular Reference to Land
Development at Poutu, Northland, 3 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 291, 292 (1978).
8
Māori Land: Ownership and Management by Tangata Whenua, CMTY. LAW
MANUAL ONLINE, http://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-2maori-land/what-this-chapter-covers-2/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
9
See Boast, supra note 3, at 555.
3
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into the official “system” of ownership, without first relinquishing it
to the government for it to be given back via Crown grant.
A. Current Aotearoa New Zealand Land Ownership Structure
Today, Aotearoa New Zealand land is divided into five
general categories. The first is “general” land. The nature of this type
of land is such that an individual holds title in fee simple, by grant of
the Crown.10 The second is Crown land itself, which is simply land
that has not been granted by the Crown to an individual owner.11 This
category of land accounts for about half of Aotearoa New Zealand’s
landmass.12 The third is the previously mentioned Māori freehold
land, which is land that has been identified and brought under the
Crown title system, but remains within the jurisdiction of the Māori
Land Court.13 Māori freehold land is subject to a number of
restrictions that make it more difficult to alienate or sell when
compared to general land. Members of Māori communities that have
relationships with the land (often called the “preferred class of
alienees”) at issue are given the right of first refusal for purchases.14
In the event that no one from the preferred class of alienees is
interested and financially qualified, land may be sold to non-Māori,
although the strong preference of the Māori Land Court is to protect
and promote Māori ownership.15 These first three categories of land
are based in the English common law system that was imposed in

10

Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
12
Richard P. Boast, Property Rights and Public Law Traditions in New Zealand, 11
N.Z. J. PUB. INT. L. 161, 180 (2013).
13
Id.
14
Alienation: Selling, Gifting, and other Transactions, CMTY. LAW MANUAL
ONLINE,
http://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-2-maoriland/alienation-selling-gifting-and-other-land-transactions/restrictions-on-sellingor-otherwise-alienating-maori-land/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
15
Māori Land and the Māori Land Court, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU,
http://www.cab.org.nz/vat/hle/ml/Pages/MaoriLandCourt.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2019).
11
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Aotearoa New Zealand, by which the Crown had ultimate title to the
land and individual title could only be derived through the Crown.16
The fourth category of land is largely symbolic at this point,
and that is land that remains under Māori customary title. This is land
that has never been moved into the feudal system, and therefore has
always remained under Māori “customary title,” without any
intervention by the Crown.17 This land is no longer alienable
according to the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act/Māori Land Act 1993.18
The fifth category is the “foreshore and seabed” land, which
comprises the common marine and coastland. This category of land
was created by the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004. This land
essentially belongs to no one.19 Although it is not owned by the
Crown, this category of land can also be seen as having extinguished
customary title.20
The division of land into the above categories, particularly the large
swaths of “general,” Crown-devised land and Crown land represents
a lasting legacy of colonization in Aotearoa New Zealand.21 The
settler-colonial anthropocentric view of land and property has become
the prevailing regime in Aotearoa New Zealand.22 The supremacy of
this system in Aotearoa New Zealand delivers a setting in which there
is great conflict between Māori beliefs and attitudes towards land and
the Aotearoa New Zealand government’s overarching approach.
B. Common Law Property Regimes
English “possessory title” is the central organizing principle
of Aotearoa New Zealand’s property law system.23 The “bundle of
16

See Shackell, supra note 6, at 94.
Id.
18
Te Ture Whenua Māori Act/Māori Land Act 1993, pt 7, c1 145 (N.Z.) (“No
person has the capacity to alienate any interest in Māori customary land or to dispose
by will of any such interest.”).
19
Boast, supra note 12, at 167.
20
Id. at 180.
21
Elaine C. Hsiao, Whanganui River Agreement, 42 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 371 (2012).
22
Blair Keown, Ownership, Kaitiakitanga and Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa New
Zealand, 2 TE TAI HARURU: J. MAORI LEGAL WRITING 66, 68 (2006).
23
Id. at 74.
17
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rights” afforded to property ownership in Aotearoa New Zealand’s
common law system allows an owner to use, manage, enjoy, convey,
and enjoy exclusive possession of property. The incidents of
ownership that arise from current Aotearoa New Zealand property
law include some things that come into direct conflict with the Māori
worldview. Rights of land possession in Māori culture are based on
ownership and use; under common law, rights of possession are based
on deeds of sale.24 Therefore, if a system is to recognize that land can
be owned, it must also generate a framework around which ownership
can be managed, acquired, and controlled.25 These incidents of
ownership are supported by Aotearoa New Zealand laws and further
reflect that the settler-colonial attitudes towards land ownership are
the entrenched principles upon which Aotearoa New Zealand
property law is founded.26
The key to property ownership in a common law system is the
right to exclusive possession.27 This notion is strongly centered
around the “individual” notions of property ownership, and
protections for individual owners are supported by common law
property actions such as trespass.28 The rights to income from
property demonstrate the individual’s exploitative relationship with
the land, whereby the owner confers an entitlement to resource use
necessarily demonstrating the submission of the land to the
individual.29 The use of resources is evidence of possession, as is the
land’s characteristic of transmissibility,30 allowing the land to be
passed in ownership from generation to generation. In Aotearoa New
Zealand, the strength of individual property ownership is
strengthened by the fact that land titles are guaranteed by the

Robert Joseph, Legal Challenges at the Interface of Māori Custom and State
Regulatory Systems: Wāhi Tapu, 13-14 Y.B.N.Z. JURIS. (2010-2011). For more
illustration of Māori and colonial attitudes to land, see Table 1.
25
Shackell, supra note 6, at 89.
26
Keown, supra note 22, at 68.
27
Id. at 72.
28
Boast, supra note 12, at 169.
29
Keown, supra note 22, at 73.
30
Id.
24
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government.31 One responsibility that arises as an incident of
ownership is the prohibition of harmful use.32 Ironically, this doesn’t
have to do with harming the land itself (as one is entitled to vis-à-vis
the incident of profit derivation), but with using one’s land to injure
another. This involves avoiding breaking laws of nuisance and
negligence, and mostly revolves around avoiding interference with
the dominion of another individual over his or her own land.
The colonial view of nature is generally anthropocentric,
meaning that humans are generally considered to be supreme over
nature,33 and revolves around “individual identity” and humans as the
dominators of the natural world. Laws and property regimes reflect
this supremacy, whereby individuals can hold complete dominion
over land or natural resources. In this strain of thought, the land is
only “good” insofar as it is useful to humans.34 In indigenous ways of
knowing, however, there is a much more symbiotic or interdependent
relationship with the land and natural world.
The Māori worldview, more expansively known as Māori
cosmology, centers on the “collective identity” where humans are but
one element within a balanced and complex natural world, where all
elements are connected through whakapapa, or genealogy.35 The
concepts briefly detailed above, especially the ideas of exclusive
possession and exploitation of natural resources, are absent from
Māori worldviews.36 In most indigenous cultures, including the
Māori, “property” regimes, insofar as they exist, treat ecological
resources (including land, rivers, forests, etc.) as “intrinsically
communal, intergenerational, and spiritually imbued with
obligation.”37 The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
31

Boast, supra note 12, at 172.
Keown, supra note 22, at 73.
33
Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Māori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand:
Protecting the Cosmology that Protects the Environment, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 273,
275 (2015).
34
Id. at 277.
35
Jacinta Ruru, Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership and Management of Mountains:
The Aoteatoa/New Zealand Experience, 3 INDIGENOUS L. J. 111, 114 (2004).
36
Keown, supra note 22, at 77.
37
MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE 271 (Cambridge University Press 2014).
32
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Peoples38 recognizes the important spiritual connection that
indigenous people worldwide have with the land.39 This is
specifically referenced in the document as an indigenous peoples’
right to “maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and
used lands, territories, wasters and coastal seas and other resources.”40
When different ideologies co-exist in the same physical space,
they can either be held in equal regard, or one can yield to the other.
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the settler-colonial common law notions
of property and ownership have taken the dominant role, with the
Māori worldview being forced into the submissive position.41 The
concepts in Māori that come closest to describing the Western notion
of ownership are themselves so multi-dimensional that the immediate
removal of context by translation erases much of their meaning.42
II. KAITIAKITANGA AND RANGATIRATANGA: CULTURAL
CONCEPTS THAT “JUST DON’T TRANSLATE”
Kaitiakitanga and rangatiratanga, which trace directly to
spirituality elements, or wairua, are Māori concepts that have
difficulty existing authentically in a legal and property framework
that was developed without them in mind. Kaitiakitanga is broadly
defined as stewardship or guaradianship,43 and rangatiratanga is
38

The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was not
originally supported by New Zealand, the United States, Canada, or Australia. The
original adoption was supported by 144 countries, opposed by the four mentioned,
with eleven countries abstaining. Since the original adoption in 2007, the four
opposing countries have reversed their positions and now support UNDRIP. See
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-therights-of-indigenous-peoples.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
39
Michelle Bryan, Valuing Sacred Tribal Waters within Prior Appropriation, 57
NAT. RES. J. 139, 143 (2017).
40
G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007).
41
Keown, supra note 22, at 67.
42
Id. at 70.
43
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 281.
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broadly defined as self-determination or sovereignty.44 The terms are
multi-dimensional and their richness only develops in their
appropriate context; however, the government of Aotearoa New
Zealand recognizes the importance of incorporating these concepts
into formal legal systems. Blair Keown describes settler-colonial
common law property ownership as a blanket, with kaitiakitanga and
rangatiratanga only able to exist in places where the blanket has holes
or provides no cover.45 The largest difference between rangatiratanga
and ownership is that ownership simply involves an individual’s
rights, where rangatiratanga is a part of the collective group’s
authority, interests, and rights.46 The key element of kaitiakitanga that
differentiates it from ownership is that it has a spiritual quality at its
core.47 In the Māori worldview, the land gives and sustains life, and
kaitiakitanga represents the obligation that humans hold in return.
The concept of rangatiratanga refers to the right of selfdetermination and sovereignty. This interpretation is based in the idea
that indigenous peoples were autonomous before colonialism and are
entitled to rights and recognition as self-governing.48 This
interpretation is also supported by the Waitangi Tribunal, who
considers the term in the context of indigenous self-management, as
opposed to entirely separate sovereignty.49 Even though it is
expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi, the concept of rangatiratanga has
always been a point of contention for Māori-Crown relations. The
English and Māori versions of the Treaty of Waitangi are internally
inconsistent with regard to sovereignty. Article I of the English
version provides for the termination of sovereignty to the Crown,
while Article II of the Māori version provides for rangatiratanga over
their land, resources, and people.50 The Māori version seems to
44

Keown, supra note 22, at 75.
Id. at 66.
46
Shackell, supra note 6, at 93.
47
Id. at 91.
48
Andrew Erueti, Māori Rights to Freshwater: The Three Conceptual Models of
Indigenous Rights, 24 WAIKATO L. REV. 58, 60 (2016).
49
WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, REPORT OF THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL ON THE
MURIWHENUA FISHING CLAIM 187 (1988).
50
Erueti, supra note 48, at 63.
45
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anticipate power-sharing, where the English version presumes the
Crown has absolute sovereignty. The English version extinguishes
broad Māori rights to self-determination and bases that presumption
in the original “giving up” of Māori independence to the Crown.
Because of the difference in the two versions of the Treaty, the
concept of rangatiratanga has been relegated to only applying where
land is under Māori legal control – an idea that is incompatible with
a Māori worldview.51
The concept of kaitiakitanga, on the other hand, does not
directly conflict with the settler-colonial notion of ownership.52
Kaitiakitanga is broadly defined as guardianship or stewardship, but
these simple explanations again remove the notion from its complex
context by trying to plug in feudal English notions. The notion of
kaitiakitanga involves the interaction between the whakapapa
(genealogical connection to the land) and the whanaungatanga (multidimensional relationships with the land).53 The relationship described
by kaitiakitanga can involve individuals but also spirits of the dead.
All humans are spiritually connected as kaitiaki, or guardians of the
land.54 Guardianship and stewardship do not necessarily capture the
“broader intangible notions of spiritual integrity, restoration of mana
and maintenance of sacred relationships,” but they are together the
closest analogous English terms and together represent how
kaitiakitanga has been understood in the Aotearoa New Zealand legal
context.55 The seeming incompatibility of these Māori concepts and
the English common law property regime which dominates much of
Aotearoa New Zealand provides an opportunity for the country to
adopt a novel approach to land management, one that would show
respect for Māori cosmologies while practically addressing
environmental concerns.

51

Keown, supra note 22, at 76.
Id. at 79.
53
Id. at 80.
54
Christopher Rodgers, A New Approach to Protecting Ecosystems: The Te Awa
Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, 19 ENVTL. L. REV. 266, 270
(2017).
55
Keown, supra note 22, at 81.
52
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III. The Movement for Personhood for Natural Objects in Aotearoa
New Zealand
The idea of granting legal personhood to natural objects,
resources, and formations arises from the work of American law
professor Christopher D. Stone. In his seminal article Should Trees
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Stone lays
out what he calls the “legal-operational aspects” and the “sociopsychic aspects” of granting personhood to natural objects.56 The
central concern addressed by Stone’s proposed framework was the
inability of an anthropocentric legal system to fully protect our
planet’s natural resources.57 According to Stone, in order to truly have
legal rights, an object’s autonomy must meet the following three
criteria: the thing must be able to create legal actions, any injury to it
must be considered in the determination of relief, and the relief must
be to the benefit of the thing.58 Without these three criteria, a natural
object does not have what could be considered legal rights in and of
themselves. There is a fourth, albeit more indirect criterion: that there
is a public authority empowered to review actions that interfere with
these rights.
With particular attention to the first three criteria, it seems
obvious that the common law property regime in Aotearoa New
Zealand is incompatible with a personhood model for natural objects.
However, Aotearoa New Zealand has illustrated and codified a
national commitment to incorporating Māori cosmologies into its
legal system where practical, and this idea of granting personhood has
been undertaken with respect to two natural objects: Te Urewera (a
former national park) and Te Awa Tupua (the face of the Whanganui
River).
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the act of “granting” personhood
to natural objects demonstrates opposing views of natural objects.
From the point of view of Parliament, granting personhood is a
concession. From the point of view of Māori, achieving personhood
56

Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 458 (1972).
57
Philippe Sands, On Being 40: A Celebration of Should Trees Have Standing, 3 J.
HUMAN RIGHTS. & ENV’T. 2 (2012).
58
Stone, supra note 56, at 458.
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is much closer to a recognition of the inherent characteristics of the
natural objects. For Māori, the Parliamentary action is simply a legal
declaration of what they have always known to be true, that the
natural objects are ancestors regardless of their legal status.59 While
it is true that this vesting of title does not necessarily perfectly reflect
traditional Māori concepts, it is the tool that is available today, within
the current property and legal regime.60
The question that remains is this: how does granting
personhood to natural objects address the incongruities between
Aotearoa New Zealand’s common law “bundle of rights” approach to
property law, and the Māori cosmological view of property,
incorporating concepts such as rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga?
Specifically, does the enacted legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand,
relating to the personhood of Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua, address
these incongruities?
A. Te Urewera Act 2014
Te Urewera was the largest national park on the North Island
of Aotearoa New Zealand. Despite its longstanding classification as
a national park, Te Urewera is the ancestral land of the Tūhoe iwi,61
who have a deep spiritual connection to it as their homeland.62 Unlike
the Whanganui, party to the Te Awa Tupua Act discussed below, the
Tūhoe never signed the Treaty of Waitangi. The Tūhoe actually
entered into a separate agreement with the Crown, known as the
Urewera Agreement, however, this agreement (along with many
others signed by other iwi) have been largely forgotten in the
“myopic” focus on the Treaty of Waitangi as the fulcrum of CrownMāori relations.63 The Tūhoe’s partial motivation for abstaining from
59

Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49,
86 (2018).
60
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 317.
61
The modern meaning of "iwi" is tribe. Traditionally, it refers more generally to a
“set of people bound together by descent from a common ancestor or ancestors;
literally: bone”. See Glossary, TE ARA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW ZEALAND,
https://teara.govt.nz/en/glossary#iwi (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
62
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 318.
63
Hannah Blumhardt, Multi-Textualism, Treaty Hegemony and the Waitangi
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the Treaty of Waitangi was their wish to retain absolute sovereignty
with no Crown intervention in their lands.64 Tūhoe lands were
transferred to Crown ownership through a combination of
confiscation and purchase, whereby the Crown consolidated
thousands of small plots into the swath that became Te Urewera
National Park.65 This ultimately became the underpinning of the legal
battle for personhood of Te Urewera, which began with an inquiry by
the Waitangi Tribunal and ended with a negotiated settlements
process; a settlement agreement signed by the Tūhoe and the Crown;
and legislation brought to Parliament.66 The Tūhoe argued that only
the restoration of their traditional relationship with the land would
allow them to adequately exercise their guardianship responsibilities,
or kaitiakitanga.67 Initially, this meant that the Tūhoe sought to
transfer title directly to the iwi, as this was the only remedy available
“within the system.” The Crown, however, was not amenable to this
option and instead offered to grant the park legal personality. In this
respect, the park would vest title to itself, and would be governed
differently than Crown-owned land.68 Some have seen this remedy as
a bit of a work-around for the Crown in order to avoid any remedy
that would truly restore full rights to the Tūhoe iwi.
The explicit objectives of the Te Urewera Act include
provisions for the management of the spiritual aspects of the land.
This is known as the “mana me mauri,” the “sense of the sensitive
perception of a living and spiritual force in a place.”69 Operationally,
the management of Te Urewera involves a Board, with a much larger
body than the analogous body in Te Awa Tupua.70 The Board is
established to “act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera” and
Tribunal: Making Sense of the 19th Century Crown-Māori Negotiations in Te
Urewera, 43 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 263, 264 (2012).
64
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 319.
65
WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, WAITANGI TRIBUNAL REPORT 50 (2015).
66
Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal
Personality for Nature in New Zealand, VertigO - la revue électronique en sciences
de l'environnement, Hors-série 22, at ¶ 5 (September, 2015).
67
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 319.
68
Id.
69
Rodgers, supra note 54, at 272.
70
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 66, at ¶ 37.
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“to provide governance for Te Urewera.”71 The Board is likewise
required to consider Tūhoe tradition and provide for the relationship
of the iwi and Te Urewera. While there are some similarities between
the Te Urewera Act and legislation that dictates the operations of
Aotearoa New Zealand’s national parks, the Te Urewera Act marks
the first time that land has been removed from the umbrella of
national park legislation.72 The Act demonstrates a “bi-cultural”
approach to the land – recognizing both its environmental importance
(through specific provisions relating to preservation, similar to the
protections provided in the previous national parks legislation) and its
cultural importance (through language specifically referring to the
Tūhoe relationship).73 The Act itself incorporates many Māori
language terms, some without translation whatsoever. Including
Māori terms in this manner has the goal of upholding the actual
concept itself, as opposed to an English translation of a foreign
cultural concept.
B. Te Awa Tupua Act 2017
The Whanganui iwi has been fighting with the government of
Aotearoa New Zealand for the recognition of their relationship with
the Whanganui River since 1873,74 making it the longest running
litigation over Māori land claims in Aotearoa New Zealand history.75
The battle has centered around the Crown’s mistreatment of the river
and its surrounds, including stripping minerals and diverting its
source waters for hydroelectric power.76 The end of the battle,
culminating in the Te Awa Tupua Act recognizing the personhood for
the river, represents a movement towards decolonization of land and
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marks an assertion of rights and decision-making over their ancestral
lands.77
Te Awa Tupua as a living being encompasses the entire
Whanganui River, from the mountains and tributaries to the sea.78 To
the Whanganui, the river is their ancestor,79 and the agreement
incorporates this geneological approach (whakapapa) to describing
the river.80 The Māori saying “ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au,”
meaning “I am the river, the river is me,” became one of the
fundamental principles of the final negotiation.81
The predecessor agreement to the Te Awa Tupua Act was the
Record of Understanding in Relation to Whanganui River Settlement
and was signed by the Whanganui iwi and the Crown as an interim
agreement in 2011. This Record of Understanding expressed
principles that would carry through into the final agreement. Among
other things, it seemed to honor the relationship between the river and
the Whanganui iwi by recognizing the interconnected nature of the
iwi’s sovereignty with that of the river, as well and the reciprocal
nature of the “health and well-being” of the iwi and the river.82 The
explicit objectives of the final legislation include the goals of
recognizing, promoting, and protecting the health and well-being of
the river and its status as Te Awa Tupua.83 The agreement also agrees
to recognize and provide for mana (roughly meaning honor, prestige,
and respect) and support the relationship of the Whanganui with the
river (te mana o te iwi).84
The Act returned the riverbed to the river itself, not to the iwi.
While vesting title in the iwi would have been a step in the right
direction of acknowledging the sovereignty of the river, the creation
of the autonomous entity of Te Awa Tupua recognizes the complete
77
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and indivisible qualities of the river in its entirety. The river itself no
longer can be owned – representing a complete break from common
law principles.85 “Te Awa Tupua is a legal person and has all the
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”86
Te Pou Tupua is the name of the office which operates as the
“human face” of the river’s personality and can interact on behalf of
the river and is responsible for protecting the river and promoting its
interests. The office consists of two (human) persons “of high
standing,”87 one nominated by the iwi having interests in the river and
one nominated by the Crown.88 Te Pou Tupua has an obligation to
uphold the tupua te kawa, which is the concept encompassing the
physical and spiritual aspects of the river. The Crown provided NZD
$30 million in a grant to help fund the Te Pou Tupua and support it in
its mission. This operates as a sort of public trust,89 with the trustees
in Te Pou Tupua acting as the “human face” of Te Awa Tupua.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERSONHOOD IDENTITY FOR MĀORI
The clear implication of the new framework under which Te
Urewera and Te Awa Tupua exist is that there is now the recognition
of a very different overall idea of property when compared to the
common law tradition.90 Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua no longer
exist in the British, settler-colonial, common law context in that
individuals may no longer own or claim property rights to them. On
the surface, it seems as though these “concessions” by the Crown are
only for the benefit of the Māori whose kinship with their natural
objects has been validated and absolutely benefit from the formal
recognition of their ancestral relationships. As Blair Keown states, “A
truly integrated system of property rights appears problematic and
perhaps unachievable. However, the Tiriti obligation of good faith
85

Hsiao, supra note 21, at 373.
Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, § 14(1).
87
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 66, at ¶ 23.
88
Rodriguez Ferrere, supra note 74, at 525.
89
Rodgers, supra note 54, at 274.
90
Id. at 276.
86

2019]

173

and the notion of partnership inherent in our nation’s founding
document have provided an opportunity for rigorous and potentially
fruitful political dialogue between the Māori and the Crown.”91 As
this paper addresses below, there are likely some additional benefits
derived from these Acts and others that may follow them. Two
centuries of title-driven property ownership and common law
practices have resulted in some challenges – particularly for
environmental protection – that these new approaches could
potentially address, to the benefit of the whole of Aotearoa New
Zealand.
A. Recognition of Ancestral Nature of Land and Natural Objects
The Māori understanding of land as an ancestor differs from
the interdependent relationship described below. The recognition of
humans as descended from the rest of the natural world is pervasive
in indigenous creation stories, and Māori culture does not tend to
separate the spiritual from the physical when considering the natural
world.92 The Whanganui iwi, for example, recognize the Whanganui
river itself as their ancestor, and see Te Awa Tupua as a being,
inseparable from the iwi.93 Likewise, the Tūhoe describe Te Urewera
as “their place of origin and return,” and have always held a deep
spiritual attachment to the land, even throughout the six decades it
classified as a national park.94
The Te Awa Tupua Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act
2017 contains the following language in recognition of the ancestral
nature of Te Awa Tupua:
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am the River and the
River is me:
The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an
inalienable connection
with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its
91

Keown, supra note 22, at 82.
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 280.
93
Hsiao, supra note 21, at 371.
94
Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 318.
92

174

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

health and wellbeing.95
This language, among other language in the Act, formalizes into law
not only the relationship between the iwi and Te Awa Tupua, but the
importance of the relationship – signaling its symbiotic nature and the
presence of kaitiakitanga.
The Te Urewera Act 2014 uses even more esoteric language
to explain the relationship between the Tūhoe and the land now
legally known as Te Urewera:
For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is Te Manawa o te Ika a Māui;
it is the
heart of the great fish of Maui, its name being derived
from
Murakareke, the son of the ancestor Tūhoe.96
Beyond the description of the land as the “heart of the great fish of
Maui,” a description earned through the mythological tale of the
demigod Maui “fishing up” the North Island with his hook,97 the Act
also refers to Te Urewera as “prized by all New Zealanders as a place
of outstanding national value and intrinsic worth.”98 This inclusion of
Te Urewera’s importance to all of New Zealand seems to give even
more credence to the relationship with the iwi, not only because it
comes chronologically after the description of the Tūhoe relationship,
but because it signals a level of trust in the iwi’s caretaking.
Although the language from the Acts formally recognizes the
inalienable nature of the connection between the iwi and Te Urewera
and Te Awa Tupua, the vesting of legal title in the name of the entities
themselves is still somewhat problematic vis-à-vis Māori traditions.99
Put simply, “indigenous cultural property transcends the classic legal
95
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concepts of markets, title, and alienability that we often associate with
ownership.”100
B. Symbiosis, not Supremacy
The differences between the ways that settler states and
indigenous populations view their relationship with natural elements
are the basis for disputes between the two regarding use of land and
natural resources. The indigenous “cosmologies,” which include
protective views of the environment, are in constant conflict with the
settlor governments by which they are bound.101 Settler-colonialists
arrived in Aotearoa New Zealand with a particularly individualistic
interpretation of property rights – humans had authority over nature
and were entitled to do as they pleased in the interest of personal or
corporate gain.102
Kaitiakitanga is the obligation to nurture and provide care.
While it is roughly translated as stewardship, this does not fully
incorporate the spiritual element that instills in Māori a responsibility
to and of their community.103 The kaitiaki relationship is not
transactional and does not involve any elements of ownership.
Additionally, the Māori term whanaungatanga roughly translates to
kinship and refers to a wide network of people, land, water, animals,
plants, and spirits.104 In this sense, humans might be the guardians of
nature, but they are not above or below any other element in the
whanaungatanga.
The systems devised to facilitate these relationships with the
land, codified by the Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts, function
differently. The “human face” of Te Awa Tupua, known as Te Pou
Tupua, consists of two individual trustees, one nominated by the iwi
having interests in the Whanganui River and one nominated on behalf
of the Crown (the first of these Crown appointments is to be
100
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nominated by the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and
all subsequent nominations are to be made by the Minister for the
Environment).105 The functions of Te Pou Tupua are to “act and speak
for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua,” and Te Pou Tupua “must act in
the interests of Te Awa Tupua.”106
The governance of Te Urewera, on the other hand, consists
of the Te Urewera Board, which consists of members appointed by
both the governing body of the Tūhoe, the Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua,
and members appointed by the Minister of the Environment and the
Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations.107 Interestingly, the
balance of the appointees shifts as time passes. In the first three years
after the settlement date, the Board is to consist of an even split of
appointees from both the iwi and the Crown, totaling eight members.
However, after the third anniversary of the settlement, the Board
shifts to a total of nine members, made up of six iwi appointees and
three Crown appointees.108 Much like the charges of the Te Pou
Tupua, the Te Urewera Board’s purpose as stated in the Act are “to
act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera; and to provide
governance for Te Urewera in accordance with this Act.”109 When
making decisions, the Board must “consider and provide
appropriately for the relationship of iwi and hapū and their culture and
traditions with Te Urewera.”110
While the respective Acts vary in drafting style, the rights and
responsibilities given to the governing bodies are relatively the same.
However, the Te Urewera Board’s structure seems to be a sharper
reflection of the concept of kaitiakitanga. While the Act charges the
Board with pursuit of unanimous decision-making, and requires it in
some cases,111 there is some flexibility for consensus decisionmaking.112 Because of the numerical breakdown of the Board, which
105
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is to consist of two-thirds majority Tūhoe appointees, decisions that
may be made by vote (if consensus cannot be achieved) would
seemingly go in favor of the Tūhoe members.
The question becomes, in the context of complex legislation
and management schemes involving human guardians, whether laws
that afford rights to humans over nature really resolve the issue of
affording rights to nature itself. Does dissolving ownership by
humans in favor of a board of appointed humans really disaggregate
the natural object from humankind? While this is likely the closest
available legal option at this point in time,113 there is also some Māorifocused justification for the involvement of humans in the
management. According to Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes:
The appointment of a body to be an official guardian
recognises “the inseparability” of the people and the
river or forest, respectively, as well as the
responsibilities inherent in that relationship for taking
care of them as kin. In this sense, these examples
emphasise the responsibilities to nature more than
nature’s rights. But it is certainly possible to place this
within a framework that emphasises nature's rights,
viewing the responsibilities as the flip side of the
human duties within a legal system that recognises
these rights.114
V. UPSCALING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS, OVERCOMING
SHORTFALLS IN COMMON LAW PROPERTY SYSTEMS
The Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts were created in
order to recognize and show respect to the Māori cosmologies, not for
environmental protection reasons.115 However, the idea of
personhood for natural formations and objects has its birthplace in
environmental protection. As stated earlier, the originator of the idea
113
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of environmental personhood was Christopher D. Stone, who
introduced the idea in the Southern California Law Review in 1972.
Therefore, the concept theoretically can go beyond the importance of
recognizing Māori relationships with the land. As Stone laid out in
his article, there are clearly links between the legal personality
concept and the goal of environmental protection.
Addressing issues of environmental protection is one of the
problems that arise from two centuries of title-driven property
ownership and common law practices. These Acts, in unifying “title”
to natural formations, may address this issue to the benefit of the
whole of Aotearoa New Zealand, not just Māori. The fallout from
title-driven property regimes, which focus on individual ownership,
is that they are often too narrow of a scope for true environmental
protections.116 English common law is focused on exclusive rights
and protecting private property, which often means that it doesn’t
allow for strategic planning or large-scale protections. In order to
provide the environmental protections that will benefit the entire
population of Aotearoa New Zealand, there needs to be a broader
approach. This means that some mechanism must facilitate planning
and execution at the landscape or ecosystem scale in order to
effectively plan conservation and protective programs.117
Both the Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts place emphasis
on the protection of nature itself, as opposed to the personal rights of
individual property owners. This is important in that they essentially
recognize the intrinsic value of nature standing alone, not just in its
context of usefulness to people.118 Most environmental legislation
today balances interests between protection of nature and use or
access by humans. By focusing on the protection of nature itself, the
Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts provide examples of
frameworks “in which the ‘environment’ is seen not as a disparate
collection of property entitlements with special attributes, but instead
as a collective whole, a living entity which incorporates all of the
physical and metaphysical elements of each ecosystem.”119
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Stone identified four criteria which should be met in order for
the concept of legal rights to truly be achieved. First, the thing must
be able to create legal actions; second, any injury to it must be
considered in the determination of relief; third, the relief must be to
the benefit of the thing; fourth and more indirectly, there should be a
public authority empowered to review anything that interferes with
these rights.120 Focusing on the first three, the Te Awa Tupua and Te
Urewera Acts as written provide examples for frameworks that
address each of the issues in the context of the title-driven, common
law legal regimes that create them.
A. Legal Standing
One of the main criteria for the validation of legal rights is the
ability to institute legal action. At common law, a natural object has
no such right. In order for there to be a suit against the polluter of a
stream in a common law system, the individual owners of individual
parcels of land must demonstrate injury. While the overall damage to
the stream may be substantial, the individual damage may or may not
be adequate to sustain a suit against the polluter. Regardless, the rights
that are honored by the courts are the rights of the owners of the
individual parcels of the stream not to be injured by another private
entity – the stream itself has no standing to protect itself.121
The issue of legal standing is a problem for environmental
justice everywhere.122 In common law property regimes, the problem
of establishing sufficient interest in an environmental dispute often
blocks claims from court.123 Typically, a plaintiff must demonstrate
harm to property or a commercial interest and satisfy close proximity
tests.124 While Aotearoa New Zealand has historically set a liberal
standard for legal standing in environmental cases,125 especially
where there has been a community impact or damage to natural
120
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resources, there still remains the issue that one natural object – a
forest, for example—could consist of several different types of
property, all which are managed differently and are under the
jurisdiction of different courts (“general” land vs. Crown land vs.
Māori freehold vs. customary title).
When it comes to legal standing, both Acts address the matter.
The Te Awa Tupua Act begins the description of Te Awa Tupua’s
legal status by declaring that Te Awa Tupua has all the rights, powers,
duties, and liabilities of a legal person.126 The Te Awa Tupua Act
imbues the Whanganui River with ‘legal standing in its own right.”
127
The Te Urewera Act’s statement of purpose begins in the
following way: “The purpose of this Act is to establish and preserve
in perpetuity a legal identity and protected status for Te Urewera”128
By establishing a legal identity for Te Urewera, Parliament has
imbued the land with the ability to enforce its own legal rights (and
to be subject to enforcement of its duties).129
B. Injury and Benefits to the Natural Object
From an environmental protection perspective, the main goal
of bestowing legal personality on a natural object is to protect that
object, whether it be a forest, a river, or an ecosystem, from injury.
The main issue with title-driven and common law property regimes,
on this matter, is defining what injury means. Stone argues that one
approach to measuring damages to the environment, which is
currently implausible under individual ownership regimes, is by
determining the “cost of making the environment whole.”130 While
he expresses reservations about quantifying what could otherwise be
considered priceless,131 he does consider including considerations
such as pain and suffering and future costs into the calculations.132
There are also concerns about dealing with environmental interests
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that some would consider useless, such as certain species of
commercially-valueless inedible fish.133 Calculating damages from
the river’s perspective could involve examining the costs associated
with restocking, which would be difficult for any individual other
than the river itself to justify. Another form of protection available to
the natural resources is injunctive relief, whereby the resource or
object can itself be a party.134 By granting legal personality to Te Awa
Tupua and Te Urewera, Parliament has given the governing bodies
the ability to sue on behalf of the natural formations themselves, with
the natural formations as parties and therefore beneficiaries of any
potential awards.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of legal personality for land and natural objects
addresses many points of difference between English common law
concepts of property and Māori notions of kinship with and
stewardship of ancestral lands. While the idea of legal personality was
conceived by an American law professor as a path to environmental
protections, it found its way to Aotearoa New Zealand as a way to
recognize Māori rights and relationships to the natural world.135
Although the two major implementations of this concept, the
Whanganui River/Te Awa Tupua Act and the Te Urewera National
Park/Te Urewera Act, were conceived in order to bolster Māori
cosmologies, they provide frameworks for and examples of how this
concept could be used to provide environmental protections in parts
of the world still restricted by common law notions of property
ownership.
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